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AMENDMENT TO SECTION 510 OF THE PENAL LAW-SUSPENSION
FELONY.-Under the common law, conviction for a felony and subsequent sentence imposed the
status of civil death upon the offender, one manifestation of which was
complete loss of all civil rights.' In New York, this doctrine has
been applied only to those sentenced to imprisonment for life.2 The
effect on civil rights of conviction, however, has been extended to
apply to all persons sentenced to imprisonment for the commission
of felonies. Section 510, New York Penal Law, before amendment
stated :
OF CIVIL RIGHTS UPON CONVICTION FOR

A sentence of imprisonment in a state prison for any term less than for life,
forfeits all the public offices, and suspends, during the term of the sentence,
all the civil rights, and all private trusts, authority, or powers of, or held by,
the person sentenced.

Inasmuch as only felonies are punishable by imprisonment in a state
penitentiary, this section does not apply to misdemeanors.3 Persons
sentenced to imprisonment in county prisons 4 or federal prisons 1 are
also excluded from the provisions of this section.
In interpreting this section, the courts have held that a person
imprisoned in a state penitentiary cannot prosecute any action or institute special proceedings for the term of the sentence being served,
as such action would be the exercise of a civil right. It has been held
that even where state legislation has granted a general right to maintain action against the state,6 the restrictions imposed by this section
are not waived and the imprisoned felon is still under a statutory
prohibition. 7 Only special legislation in the form of an enabling act
by the legislature would enable an imprisoned felon to bring action
in the courts while under the disability imposed by Section 510. In
such a case, the right to sue would not be considered the exercise of
a civil right, but the use of a special right conferred by special
legislation.8
Where the sentence of imprisonment has been commuted, the
civil rights of the prisoner are restored when he is freed.9 Inasmuch
as a commutation of sentence reduces the term of imprisonment, the
effective date of commutation terminates the statutory disabilities of
14
BL Comm. *336 *383; 2 KENT CoMM. *386.
2
N. Y. PExAL LAw § 511. A person sentenced to imprisonment for life
is thereafter deemed civilly dead.
34 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 2.
Bowles v. Habermann, 95 N. Y. 246 (1884).
5 Matter of O'Connor, 173 Misc. 419, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 758 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
6 CoURT OF CLAims ACT § 8, Laws 1939, c. 860 (waiving the state's immunity from liability for torts of its officers and employees and conferring
jurisdiction for such cases on a court of claims).
7 Green v. State, 251 App. Div. 108, 295 N. Y. Supp. 672 (4th Dep't 1937),
aff'd,8 278 N. Y. 15, 14 N. E. (2d) 833 (1938).
Tomaselli v. State, 168 Misc. 674, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 435 (Ct. Cl. 1938).
9 Application of White, 166 Misc. 481, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 582 (Ct. Cl. 1938).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 21

Section 510. But in Lehrmann v. State,10 where the person attempting to bring action was a convict on parole from a state prison, the
court held that a parole could not be treated in the same manner as
a commutation of sentence. Statutory provisions dealing with
parole 11 provide only for the physical liberation of the prisoner as
long as he complies with the conditions of his parole. Parole does
not, as in the case of a commutation, result in a termination of the
sentence and the resulting restoration of civil rights. In rendering
its decision, the court indicated that further legislation would be
necessary in order for a parole to remove the restrictions imposed by
Section 510. By amendment to Section 116 of the Executive Law,
power is given the state board of parole to restore civil rights to a
convicted felon on application2 by the felon five years after the legal
termination of his sentence.'
A similar question arose in a case where sentence involving imprisonment in a state prison had been passed, but where execution
of sentence had been suspended. In People ex rel. Forsyth v. Court
of Sessions,'5 Mr. Justice O'Brien stated:
The power to suspend sentence and the power to grant reprieves and pardons
...are totally distinct and different ....
The suspension of sentence simply
postpones the judgment of the court temporarily or indefinitely, but the con-

viction and liability following it, and all civil disabilities, remain and become
operative when judgment is rendered.

This difference in the application of Section 510 to convicts who
had been pardoned or had had their sentence commuted, and those
on parole or awaiting execution of sentence was recognized by the
New York Law Revision Commission, with the result that it recommended to the state legislature an amendment to Section 510 14 that
would modify the loss of civil rights by felons on parole or awaiting
execution of sentence. The recommended amendment was adopted
on March 30, 194615 and provides:
A sentence of imprisonment in a state prison for any term less than for life,

forfeits all the public offices, and suspends, during the term of the sentence,
all the civil rights, and all private trusts, authority, or powers of, or held by,
the person sentenced; but nothing herein contained shall be deemed to stspend
the right or capacity of any of the following persons to institute an action or
proceeding in a court or before a body or officer exercising judicial, quasijidicial or administrative functions, with respect to matters other than those
arising out of his arrest or detention.
a. A person sentenced to state prison for any term less than for life,
10 176 Misc. 1022, 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 635 (Ct. Cl. 1941) ; accord, Hayes v.

State, 50 N. Y. S. (2d) 492 (Ct. Cl. 1944).
11 N. Y. CoRRzrxON LAW § 210 et seq.
12 N. Y. Laws 1945, c. 96, effective March 6, 1945.
is 141 N. Y. 288, 294, 36 N. E. 386, 388 (1894).
14N. Y. LAW REVISION COMMISSION REPORT, LEGIS.
(1946).
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on whom sentence was imposed and the execution of the judgment suspended,
while the execution of the judgment remains suspended.
b. A person sentenced to state prison for any term less than for life,
while he is released on parole. (Italicized portion added by the 1946 amendment.)

Three important distinctions still remain with regard to felons
on parole or awaiting execution of judgment. First, as opposed to
convicts who have been pardoned or had their sentences commuted,
the relief granted by this amendment is temporary and will apply only
as long as the person remains on parole or awaits execution of judgment. Second, not all civil rights are restored, but only the right to
maintain action in the courts. Third, even as to the right to maintain action, a restriction is imposed limiting such action to those not
arising from the arrest or detention resulting in the original sentence.
As Section 510 now reads, the right to maintain action is denied
to all those actually imprisoned in state prisons. This disability is
personal to the prisoner and does not bar the maintenance of an action by the assignee of the prisoner where the assignee's title to the
cause of action is the result of an involuntary assignment by operation
of law (i.e., a receiver in bankruptcy),'6 or where the prisoner retains no beneficial interest in the cause of action.' 7 Although the imprisoned felon may not maintain an action, an action may nevertheless be brought against him, process may be served on him in prison,' 8
and the convict has the right of court process to the extent necessary
to defend himself.19 Once action is brought against him, the convict
may enter counterclaims and any defense necessary to the action.
For the period of the disability under Section 510, the Civil
Practice Act 20 extends the permissible period within which to bring
an action by providing that the Statute of Limitations shall be tolled
during the period of such legal disability. This extension, however,
is for not more than Jive years, and beyond such period, the Statute
of Limitations will not be suspended.
It should be noted that forfeiture of civil rights imposed by Section 510 does not affect the convict's property rights. Forfeiture of
property upon conviction is specifically prohibited by law,2 ' and the
'5 Laws 1946, c. 260, effective March 30, 1946.
16Kugel

v. Kalik, 176 Misc. 49, 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 327 (Sup. Ct. 1941),

aff'd, 262 App. Div. 823, 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 734 (1st Dep't 1941).
17 Bamman v. Erickson, 259 App. Div. 1041, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 40 (2d Dep't

1940).

18 N. Y. Cirv. PRAc. Acr § 165.
19 Matter of Weber's Estate, 165 Misc. 815, 819, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 809, 812

(Surr. Ct. 1938). "For reasons of practical convenience and on the basis that
objectant is here brought into the controversy without initiative on his part,
the court holds that objectant is not required to proceed through a trustee but
may20personally appear in the proceeding through counsel."
N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Act § 60.
2
1 N. Y.

PENAL LAW

§ 512.
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convict is free to receive or transfer property, both real and personal. 22
With regard to civil rights other than the right to maintain action and the right to hold property, there has been little litigation
under Section 510. In one case,23 in construing the portion of the
section which provides for forfeiture of public office, the ruling was
made that the section also prohibits the holding of a public office after
conviction and sentence and prior to final release.
With the adoption of the 1946 amendment to Section 510 of the
New York Penal Law, the one questionable application of the section
has been clarified. There remains no doubt, as far as the questions
raised in reported cases so far, as to its future interpretation.
PHILIP J. HIRscH.

22

Kugel v. Kalik, 176 Misc. 79, 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 327 (Sup. Ct. 1941),
823, 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 734 (1st Deo't 1941).
aff'd,
2 3 262 App. Div.
Matter of Lindgren, 198 App. Div. 319, 190 N. Y. Supp. 321 (1st Dep't
1921), aff'd, 232 N. Y. 59, 133 N. E. 353 (1921).

